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Ambiguity Framed
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In his exposition of subjective expected utility theory, Savage (1954) proposed that the Allais
paradox could be reduced if it were recast into a format which made the appeal of the
independence axiom of expected utility theory more transparent. Recent studies consistently find
support for this prediction. We consider a salience-based choice model which explains this
frame-dependence of the Allais paradox and derive the novel prediction that the same type of
presentation format which was found to reduce Allais-style violations of expected utility theory
will also reduce Ellsberg-style violations of subjective expected utility theory since that format
makes the appeal of Savage’s “sure thing principle” more transparent. We design an experiment
to test this prediction and find strong support for such frame dependence of ambiguity aversion
in Ellsberg-style choices. In particular, we observe markedly less ambiguity-averse behavior in
Savage’s matrix format than in a more standard ‘prospect’ format. This finding poses a new
challenge for the leading models of ambiguity aversion.
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1. Introduction
Expected utility (EU) theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) and subjective
expected utility (SEU) theory (Savage, 1954) are widely recognized as the standard models of
rational decision making under risk and uncertainty. Both models have also been applied as
descriptive theories of actual behavior, although persistent empirical challenges were raised soon
after the models were introduced. Allais (1953) devised pairs of choices, one involving a certain
outcome and a risky prospect and the other a choice between two risky prospects where people
frequently1 violate the independence axiom of EU. Ellsberg (1961) presented pairs of choices
each involving a risky prospect (whose probabilities are given) and an uncertain prospect (whose
probabilities are unknown) where people frequently violate the ‘sure-thing’ principle of SEU.
In his exposition of subjective expected utility, Savage (1954) digressed to address the
Allais-type violations of the independence axiom. He conjectured that these violations might be
reduced if the choice situations were reframed in a transparent format. Tests of this prediction,
discussed below, have consistently found that the Allais paradox is susceptible to framing, with
significantly fewer violations in Savage’s proposed presentation format. Since the Ellsberg
paradox also violates an independence condition, we ask whether applying Savage’s presentation
format to Ellsberg-style choices leads to fewer violations of SEU: To our knowledge this
question has not been previously investigated. We ground our investigation in new and rigorous
theory formalizing the notion of a transparent frame (Leland and Schneider 2016) and recent
theory formalizing salience (e.g., Bordalo et al. 2012; Koszegi and Szeidl 2013).

2. Motivation
Consider Savage’s (1954) version of the Allais paradox: Figure 1 presents this version in two
different frames (payoffs are in thousands of dollars). The left panel of Figure 1 presents it in
what we call minimal or efficient frames.2 In Savage’s version, a decision maker chooses
between lotteries 𝑝 and 𝑞 and then chooses between lotteries 𝑝′ and 𝑞′. Lottery 𝑝 offers $500,000
1

We are speaking here of the classic Allais example, which is a thought experiment involving very large
hypothetical outcomes which no experimenter can actually pay out. When its outcomes are proportionally scaled
down to an experimentally feasible size for actual payment, similar behavior does not always occur (e.g. Conlisk
1989; Fan 2002). This could be either a payoff magnitude effect or a hypothetical versus real incentives effect. In
incentivized experiments, the generalized Allais example (known as the common consequence effect) does not
always occur (Burke et al. 1996) and sometimes occurs in ‘non-classic’ ways (Starmer 1992).
2
A minimal frame is a matrix presentation of choice alternatives which (among other properties) has the smallest
dimension (fewest number of columns) needed to represent those alternatives. See Leland and Schneider (2016) for
formal property lists which uniquely define minimal and transparent frames.
1

with certainty, whereas 𝑞 offers a 10% chance of $2.5 million, an 89% chance of $500,000, and a
1% chance of $0. The independence axiom (and Savage’s sure-thing principle) imply that a
decision maker with strict preferences will choose either 𝑝 and 𝑝′ or 𝑞 and 𝑞′ (in accord with the
decision maker’s attitude toward risk). Yet Savage himself reports expressing a preference for 𝑝
over 𝑞 and for 𝑞′ over 𝑝′ (Savage, 1954), in violation of his own theory!

Figure 1. The Allais Paradox in Minimal and Transparent Frames
The Allais Paradox in Minimal Frames
(x1,y1) (p1,q1)
p
500
0.10
q 2500 0.10

(x2,y2)
500
500

(p2,q2)
0.89
0.89

(x1,y1) (p1,q1)
500
0.11
2500 0.10

(x2,y2)
0
0

(p2,q2)
0.89
0.90

p′
q′

(x3,y3)
500
0

(p3,q3)
0.01
0.01

The Allais Paradox in Transparent Frames
(x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2) (p2,q2) (x3,y3) (p3,q3)
p
500
0.10
500
0.89
500
0.01
q 2500 0.10
500
0.89
0
0.01

p′
q′

(x1,y1) (p1,q1) (x2,y2)
500
0.10
0
2500 0.10
0

(p2,q2) (x3,y3)
0.89
500
0.89
0

(p3,q3)
0.01
0.01

Troubled by his own expressed preferences, Savage (1954) invites consideration of an
alternative presentation of the same choices: We show a similar presentation in the right panel of
Figure 1. In this presentation, it is clear that 𝑝 and 𝑞 each offer an 89% chance of $500,000 and
that 𝑝′ and 𝑞′ each offer an 89% chance of $0. Savage proposes that this change in framing may
enhance the appeal of the independence axiom and produce more consistent choices: Following
his suggestion, we say that this presentation employs transparent frames. In particular, a
transparent frame isolates the common consequences of the lotteries under consideration and
focuses attention on the differences between lotteries as prescribed by the independence axiom.
A number of recent studies (Leland, 2010; Bordalo et al., 2012; Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher,
2012; Birnbaum and Schmidt, 2015; Harman and Gonzalez, 2015) have investigated whether
observed behavior is more consistent with Savage’s theory when the Allais paradox choices are
presented to subjects in transparent frames. All of these studies find support for Savage’s
conjecture. Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher (2012) conclude that “given a transparent presentation,
expected utility theory performs surprisingly well.”
Leland and Schneider (2016) formalize matrix presentations of lotteries (like those used by
Savage) and develop a salience-based decision algorithm that operates over frames. Their
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theoretical work implies that ambiguity aversion is also susceptible to framing: The same
transparent framing that reduces Allais-style violations of EU should reduce Ellsberg-style
violations of SEU. Figure 2 illustrates this with choice situations from our new experiment—as
these were presented to our subjects. The top pair shows a choice between two acts (statecontingent lotteries) in minimal frames. The lottery the decision maker plays depends on her
choice (act 𝐴 or act 𝐵) and the realization of an ambiguous state of the world (a ‘red ticket’ state
or a ‘blue ticket’ state). The decision maker does not know the probability that the true state is
red or blue. As in Ellsberg’s classic paradox, one act (𝐴) is merely risky because it yields the
same lottery regardless of the state: In keeping with relevant theoretical work (Grant and Polak
2013), we call these “constant acts.” The other act (𝐵) is an “ambiguous act” (it yields different
lotteries in different states). The decision maker is also given a similar choice in which the
lotteries assigned to the red and blue ticket states are reversed. This construction resembles that
in Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color paradox.

Figure 2. Ellsberg’s Paradox in Minimal Frames (top) and Transparent Frames (bottom)

A
B

You Draw a Red Ticket
$ N/12 $ N/12
$25 6/12 $0 6/12
$25 9/12 $0 3/12

You Draw a Red Ticket
$ N/12 $ N/12 $ N/12
A $25 6/12 $0 3/12 $0 3/12
B $25 6/12 $25 3/12 $0 3/12

You Draw a Blue Ticket
$ N/12 $ N/12
$25 6/12 $0 6/12
$25 3/12 $0 9/12
You Draw a Blue Ticket
$ N/12 $ N/12 $ N/12
$25 3/12 $25 3/12 $0 6/12
$25 3/12 $0 3/12 $0 6/12

The SEU model predicts that a decision maker who strictly prefers 𝐴 to 𝐵 in the top panel of
Figure 2 will also strictly prefer 𝐵 to 𝐴 when the lotteries assigned to red and blue states are
reversed—acting as if that agent assigns a subjective probability distribution over states.
However, in similar types of choices, Ellsberg (1961) found that many people preferred 𝐴 to 𝐵
regardless of whether the assignment of lotteries to states is reversed. Since 𝐴 offers a known
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probability of winning a prize, whereas the probability of winning in 𝐵 is ambiguous, the strict
preference for 𝐴 is termed ambiguity aversion.
The choices between 𝐴 and 𝐵 could, like the Allais lotteries, be presented in the ‘transparent’
frames shown in the bottom of Figure 2. In this ‘Savage’ presentation, for the choice between 𝐴
and 𝐵, the common consequences in each state-contingent lottery are isolated, encouraging the
decision maker to focus on the differences between 𝐴 and 𝐵 (the 3/12 chance of 𝐴 paying $0 and
𝐵 paying $25 in the red state and the 3/12 chance of 𝐴 paying $25 and 𝐵 paying $0 in the blue
state). A decision maker who focuses only on these differences and assigns a uniform prior over
states will then be indifferent between 𝐴 and 𝐵, regardless of whether the assignment of lotteries
to states is reversed. This reasoning suggests that transparent framing of the Ellsberg paradox
will produce behavior closer to ambiguity neutrality. However, such frame-dependence of
ambiguity aversion is not consistent with any of the leading models of ambiguity aversion in the
literature. The following section shows that Leland and Schneider’s (2016) model predicts this
under fairly general conditions, and introduces a variant of their model generalizing the
prediction in an empirically useful way. Our new experiment finds strong support for this
generalized version of the prediction.
There is but a small and very recent literature on the possibility that ambiguity attitudes are
susceptible to framing effects. Chew et al. (2017) examine whether presentation of choice
alternatives as text description versus payoff tables (so as to make the ambiguity inherent in the
choices more or less explicit) influences the degree of ambiguity aversion observed. They find
that for subjects who do not recognize ambiguity in some tasks, emphasizing ambiguity produces
greater ambiguity aversion. However, subjects that recognized ambiguity in each task were more
ambiguity-averse than those who did not recognize ambiguity in some tasks, regardless of
whether the ambiguity is emphasized. Trautmann and van der Kuijlen (2014) examine attitudes
toward ambiguity for gains versus losses. They report results suggesting that ambiguity aversion
varies according to whether the outcomes are gains or losses, as has been observed for attitudes
toward risk. Finally, Voorhoeve et al. (2016) test the findings in Chew et al. (2017) and in
Trautmann and van der Kuijlen (2014), and fail to find significant support for the hypotheses that
emphasizing ambiguity, or reframing gains as losses, alters the prevalence of ambiguity aversion.
With these mixed findings, we think there is room for more experimental work. Additionally, the
next section provides a highly focused theoretical motivation for our new experiment.
4

3. Two Salience-based Models of Choice under Uncertainty
Leland and Schneider (2016) employ a matrix representation of the attributes (e.g. payoffs
and probabilities in lotteries) of pairs of alternatives: We follow this for pairs of acts. A generic
frame for simple Ellsberg-style choices which encompasses the basic pairs of acts used in our
experiment is shown in Figure 3 in which there are two possible states 𝜔 ∈ {𝑟, 𝑏} –“red ticket”
and “blue ticket” states 𝑟 and 𝑏. The decision maker does not know the underlying state 𝜔. In
Figure 3, act 𝑋 offers lottery {𝑥1𝑟 , 𝑝1𝑟 ; … ; 𝑥𝑛𝑟𝑟 , 𝑝𝑛𝑟𝑟 } when 𝜔 = 𝑟 and offers lottery
{𝑥1𝑏 , 𝑝1𝑏 ; … ; 𝑥𝑛𝑏𝑏 , 𝑝𝑛𝑏𝑏 } when 𝜔 = 𝑏. Likewise, act 𝑌 offers lottery {𝑦1𝑟 , 𝑞1𝑟 ; … ; 𝑦𝑛𝑟𝑟 , 𝑞𝑛𝑟 𝑟 } when
𝜔 = 𝑟 and lottery {𝑦1𝑏 , 𝑞1𝑏 ; … ; 𝑦𝑛𝑏𝑏 , 𝑞𝑛𝑏𝑏 } when 𝜔 = 𝑏. All frames in the experiment presented
outcomes that monotonically decrease (from left to right) in each state-contingent lottery: In
Figure 3, this entails that 𝑥1𝑟 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑥𝑛𝑟𝑟 and 𝑥1𝑏 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑥𝑛𝑏𝑏 for act 𝑋 and analogous
monotonicity for act 𝑌. Note that the index 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑛𝜔 } in Figure 3 denotes the location of
the ith column vector in each state 𝜔’s frame.
Figure 3. A Generic Frame under Ambiguity
Red Ticket State

Blue Ticket State

X

𝑥1𝑟

𝑝1𝑟

…

𝑥𝑖𝑟

𝑝𝑖𝑟

…

𝑥𝑛𝑟𝑟

𝑝𝑛𝑟𝑟

𝑥1𝑏

𝑝1𝑏

…

𝑥𝑖𝑏

𝑝𝑖𝑏

…

𝑥𝑛𝑏𝑏

𝑝𝑛𝑏𝑏

Y

𝑦1𝑟

𝑞1𝑟

…

𝑦𝑖𝑟

𝑞𝑖𝑟

…

𝑦𝑛𝑟𝑟

𝑞𝑛𝑟𝑟

𝑦1𝑏

𝑞1𝑏

…

𝑦𝑖𝑏

𝑞𝑖𝑏

…

𝑦𝑛𝑏𝑏

𝑞𝑛𝑏𝑏

3.1 Salience-Weighted Utility of Presentations (SWUP) Derived from SEU
Given the notion of a frame as a matrix representation of state-contingent lotteries, we can
model the behavior of a frame-sensitive decision maker by developing a computational decision
algorithm which operates over frames. To do so, following Leland and Schneider (2016), we
start with the SEU model of Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
More generally, index the possible states of the world by 𝜔 ∈ Ω = {1,2, … , 𝑚}. Denote
ambiguous acts by 𝑋 and 𝑌, where 𝑋 assigns lottery 𝑋(𝜔) with corresponding payoff and
probability vectors (𝐱 𝝎 , 𝒑𝝎 ) to each state. Likewise, 𝑌 assigns lottery 𝑌(𝜔) with payoff and
probability vectors (𝐲 𝝎 , 𝒒𝝎 ) to each state. In the classic alternative-based evaluation model,
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there is a unique subjective probability distribution 𝜋 over states (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963)
such that 𝑋 is chosen over 𝑌 if and only if
(1)

𝜔

𝜔

𝑛
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔 𝜔
𝑚 𝑛
𝜔 𝜔
∑𝑚
𝜔 ∑𝑖 𝜋 [𝑝𝑖 𝑢(𝑥𝑖 )] > ∑𝜔 ∑𝑖 𝜋 [𝑞𝑖 𝑢(𝑦𝑖 )].

We may equivalently rewrite eq. 1 as an attribute-based comparative evaluation model:
(2)

𝜔

𝑛
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
∑𝑚
𝜔 ∑𝑖 𝜋 [(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 )(𝑢(𝑥𝑖 ) + 𝑢(𝑦𝑖 ))/2 + (𝑢(𝑥𝑖 ) − 𝑢(𝑦𝑖 ))(𝑝𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖 )/2] > 0.

Leland and Schneider (2016) note that this “attribute-based evaluation computes probability
differences associated with outcomes weighted by the average utility of those outcomes plus
utility differences of outcomes weighted by their average probability of occurrence.” Agents who
choose according to eq. 2 will make the same choices as agents who choose according to the
SEU model in eq. 1. But drawing on recent work which highlights the role of salience perception
in decision making (e.g., Bordalo et al., 2012; Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013), suppose that when
comparing state-contingent lotteries, agents focus more on large differences in payoffs or
probabilities and systematically overweight them as a consequence. To formalize this intuition,
Leland and Schneider place weights 𝜓Ρ (𝑝𝑖𝜔 , 𝑞𝑖𝜔 ) on probability differences and 𝜓Χ (𝑥𝑖𝜔 , 𝑦𝑖𝜔 ) on
payoff differences, yielding a model in which 𝑋 is strictly preferred to 𝑌 if and only if
(3)

𝜔

𝑛
𝜔 𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
𝜔
∑𝑚
𝜔 ∑𝑖 𝜋 [ 𝜓Ρ (𝑝𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖 )(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 )(𝑢(𝑥𝑖 ) + 𝑢(𝑦𝑖 ))/2

+ 𝜓Χ (𝑥𝑖𝜔 , 𝑦𝑖𝜔 )(𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝜔 ) − 𝑢(𝑦𝑖𝜔 ))(𝑝𝑖𝜔 + 𝑞𝑖𝜔 )/2] > 0.
Leland and Schneider (2016) call this representation of preferences “salience weighted utility
over presentations” or SWUP: The weights 𝜓Ρ (𝑝𝑖𝜔 , 𝑞𝑖𝜔 ) and 𝜓Χ (𝑥𝑖𝜔 , 𝑦𝑖𝜔 ) are “salience functions”
satisfying two critical properties of salience perception noted in Bordalo et al. (2012; 2013):

Definition 1 (Salience Function): A salience function 𝜓(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ) is any (non-negative),
symmetric and continuous function that satisfies the following two properties:
1. Ordering: If [𝑎𝑖′ , 𝑏𝑖′ ] ⊂ [𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ] then 𝜓(𝑎𝑖′ , 𝑏𝑖′ ) < 𝜓(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ).
2. Diminishing Sensitivity: for any 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 , 𝜖 > 0, 𝜓(𝑎𝑖 + 𝜖, 𝑏𝑖 + 𝜖) < 𝜓(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ).
SWUP explains the Allais paradox framing effect conjectured by Savage. In the transparent
frame in Figure 1, a decision maker who acts in accordance with SWUP chooses 𝑝 over 𝑞 if and
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only if she chooses 𝑝′ over 𝑞′, consistent with the independence axiom. In contrast, the salience
evaluations in the two choice pairs can differ under minimal frames, enabling the model to
accommodate the Allais paradox. SWUP not only explains the Allais framing effect but also
predicts a novel framing effect in the context of Ellsberg’s paradox. We can now apply the
SWUP model to demonstrate this prediction.

3.2

The Ellsberg Paradox in Minimal and Transparent Frames
We illustrate SWUP with basic pair 1 from our experiment: Figure 4 shows two minimal

frame versions of this pair. Set 𝑢($25) = 1 and 𝑢($0) = 0, and let 𝜋 𝑟 denote the subjective
probability that the true state is red. Then SWUP predicts that 𝐴 is chosen over 𝐵 if
𝜋 𝑟 𝜓Ρ (0.5,0.75)(−0.25) + (1 − 𝜋 𝑟 )𝜓Ρ (0.5, 0.25)(0.25) > 0.
As observed by Leland and Schneider (2016), symmetry and diminishing sensitivity of 𝜓Ρ imply
that 𝜓Ρ (0.5, 0.25) > 𝜓Ρ (0.5,0.75). Thus, under a uniform prior, a SWUP decision maker
chooses constant act 𝐴 over ambiguous option 𝐵, and likewise chooses constant act 𝐴′ over
ambiguous option 𝐵′, for any salience function 𝜓Ρ . Hence, SWUP predicts ambiguity aversion in
minimal frames. In the minimal frames of Figure 4, all payoff differences within each column
vector are zero, so that behavior under SWUP depends solely on the subjective prior over states
and the probability salience function.

Figure 4. The Ellsberg Paradox in Minimal Frames

Red Ticket State

Blue Ticket State

A

$25

0.50

$0

0.50

$25

0.50

$0

0.50

B

$25

0.75

$0

0.25

$25

0.25

$0

0.75

Red Ticket State

Blue Ticket State

A′ $25

0.50

$0

0.50

$25

0.50

$0

0.50

$25

0.25

$0

0.75

$25

0.75

$0

0.25

B′
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Figure 5 shows two transparent frame versions of basic pair 1: Here the probability
differences within each column vector are zero, so behavior is determined solely by the
subjective prior and payoff salience. In particular, SWUP now predicts that 𝐴 is chosen over 𝐵 if
𝜋 𝑟 𝜓Χ (0,25)(−1) + (1 − 𝜋 𝑟 )𝜓Χ (25,0)(1) > 0.
However, under a uniform prior over states and by symmetry of 𝜓Χ , the left side of this
expression is identically zero, so the decision maker is predicted to be indifferent between 𝐴 and
𝐵 (and is likewise predicted to be indifferent between 𝐴′ and 𝐵′). Thus, this version of SWUP
(derived from SEU) predicts ambiguity aversion in minimal frames and ambiguity-neutrality in
transparent frames (for any utility function, and any salience function).

Figure 5. The Ellsberg Paradox in Transparent Frames
Red Ticket State

Blue Ticket State

A

$25

0.50

$0

0.25

$0

0.25

$25

0.25

$25

0.25

$0

0.50

B

$25

0.50

$25

0.25

$0

0.25

$25

0.25

$0

0.25

$0

0.50

Red Ticket State

Blue Ticket State

A′

$25

0.25

$25

0.25

$0

0.50

$25

0.50

$0

0.25

$0

0.25

B′

$25

0.25

$0

0.25

$0

0.50

$25

0.50

$25

0.25

$0

0.25

3.3 Unifying Frame-Independent and Frame-Sensitive behavior toward Ambiguity
The SWUP model derived above from SEU explains the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes and
predicts that they are sensitive to framing, and does so with one coherent subjective prior over
states. It formalizes the intuition of frame-dependent decision making in a simple manner.
However, its predictions are too restrictive to accommodate the variety of subject behavior
observed in many experiments. For data analysis, we need a version of SWUP that allows for
individual differences in ambiguity attitudes independent of frames. We do so by embedding
SWUP’s comparative form in a simple and well-known model of ambiguity attitudes—the
8

Hurwicz (1951) optimism criterion—instead of SEU.3 In the Anscombe-Aumann framework, the
Hurwicz criterion evaluates ambiguous acts according to the convex combination of the best and
worst-case expected utilities generated by the act across all states of the world: Act 𝑋 is weakly
preferred to act 𝑌 if and only if 𝐻(𝑋) ≥ 𝐻(𝑌), where 𝐻(𝑋) is
𝜔

𝜔

𝛼 max𝜔∈Ω ∑𝑛𝑖 𝑝𝑖𝜔 𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝜔 ) + (1 − 𝛼) min𝜔Ω ∑𝑛𝑖 𝑝𝑖𝜔 𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝜔 ).

(4)

We propose an analogous ‘Hurwicz-SWUP’ criterion that allows for frame-independent
heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes. Let 𝑋 be ‘more ambiguous’4 than 𝑌. Then under the
Hurwicz-SWUP criterion, 𝑋 is preferred to 𝑌 if and only if 𝑆(𝑋, 𝑌) > 0, where
𝜔

(5) 𝑆(𝑋, 𝑌) = 𝛼 max𝜔∈Ω ∑𝑛𝑖 [
+ (1 −

𝜔 𝜓Ρ
𝛼) min𝜔∈Ω ∑𝑛𝑖 [

𝜓Ρ (𝑝𝑖𝜔 ,𝑞𝑖𝜔 )(𝑝𝑖𝜔 −𝑞𝑖𝜔 )(𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝜔 )+𝑢(𝑦𝑖𝜔 ))
2

(𝑝𝑖𝜔 ,𝑞𝑖𝜔 )(𝑝𝑖𝜔 −𝑞𝑖𝜔 )(𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝜔 )+𝑢(𝑦𝑖𝜔 ))
2

+

+

𝜓Χ (𝑥𝑖𝜔 ,𝑦𝑖𝜔 )(𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝜔 )−𝑢(𝑦𝑖𝜔 ))(𝑝𝑖𝜔 +𝑞𝑖𝜔 )
2

𝜓Χ (𝑥𝑖𝜔 ,𝑦𝑖𝜔 )(𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝜔 )−𝑢(𝑦𝑖𝜔 ))(𝑝𝑖𝜔 +𝑞𝑖𝜔 )
2

]

].

The above formulation computes a weighted average of the best-case and worst-case SWUP
comparisons between the more and less ambiguous acts. This formulation decomposes behavior
toward ambiguity into a frame-independent ambiguity attitude, 𝛼, and a frame-dependent
component determined by salience functions 𝜓Ρ (𝑝𝑖𝜔 , 𝑞𝑖𝜔 ) and 𝜓Χ (𝑥𝑖𝜔 , 𝑦𝑖𝜔 ) and the frame of the
decision. Proposition 1 below follows from eq. 5 (Section A4 of our Appendix shows this).
Proposition 1: Let ≻ (~) denote strict preference (indifference) as determined by the HurwiczSWUP criterion in eq. 5. For the choice situations shown in Figures A1 and A2 of Appendix
Section A4 (Figures 4 and 5 are examples), with constant act 𝑌 and ambiguous act 𝑋:
(i)

If 𝑋 ~ 𝑌 in the minimal frame then 𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 in the transparent frame.

(ii)

If 𝑋 ~ 𝑌 in the transparent frame then 𝑌 ≻ 𝑋 in the minimal frame.

Another SWUP variant would add a probability 𝜗 ∈ [0,1] that the agent naturally re-frames transparent
presentations as minimal ones. This is particularly plausible if people naturally think in minimal frames. 𝜗 then
governs the strength of the framing effect for that agent (agents with 𝜗 = 1 are frame insensitive and agents with
𝜗 = 0 conform to SEU in transparent frames but exhibit ambiguity aversion in minimal frames). This SWUP variant
accommodates reduced ambiguity aversion (without requiring ambiguity neutrality) in transparent frames, but still
rules out ambiguity seeking behavior. Hurwicz-SWUP allows any ambiguity attitude, but requires less ambiguity
aversion (or more ambiguity seeking) in transparent frames than in minimal frames.
4
While there is not yet a general consensus for ranking all pairs of ambiguous acts by their level of ambiguity, one
natural approach is given by the family of 𝑓-divergences which measures the distance between two probability
distributions. In Section A3 of our Appendix we show that two well-known 𝑓-divergences – the Hellinger distance
(Hellinger, E., 1909; Sengar, 2009) and the total variation distance (Levin et al., 2009) predict the same ranking of
ambiguous acts for each of the basic pairs in our experimental design.
3
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Thus Hurwicz-SWUP makes the comparative statics prediction that subjects will be less
ambiguity averse in transparent frames than in minimal frames for appropriately constructed
choice situations shown in Appendix A4: We test this prediction.

4. The Experiment
Within the experiment, and henceforth, we use the layman’s term “options” instead of the
theorist’s term “acts.” Our experiment consists of 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 11 “basic pairs” of options, where
each pair involves a choice between a more ambiguous and a less ambiguous option. Repeated
trials of each basic pair, with variations of presentation, create a total of 𝑠 = 1, 2, . . . , 60 choice
situations presented to each subject. In each situation, subjects chose just one of three responses:
“I prefer Option A,” “I prefer Option B,” or “I am indifferent between Option A and Option B.”
Table 1 presents the basic pairs and all variations of them. After a subject made all 60 choices,
she drew a card from a deck of cards numbered from 1 to 60, selecting the subject’s chosen
option from one situation for payment. (If she chose indifference in that situation, the
experimenter flipped a coin to choose either option A or option B for the subject.) Uncertainty in
the chosen option was then resolved in two stages. In the first stage, the subject drew a ticket
from a opaque bag containing ten paper raffle tickets in an unknown mixture of red and blue
tickets. As shown in Table 1, the drawn ticket color determined a lottery to be played out. In the
second stage the subject rolled a twelve-sided die to determine her payment from the lottery.
This payment was $25 or $0 ($11.01 averaged across the 79 subjects)5 which, when added to a
flat $15 participation fee, yielded average subject earnings of $26.01.
The subjects were seventy-nine6 undergraduate students at a U.S. university.7 Subjects were
seated in visually isolated carrels in a laboratory. From the beginning to the end of each
experimental session, each subject had an opaque bag hanging in the corner of his or her carrel.
Subjects were truthfully told that each bag contained an unknown mixture of ten red and/or blue

5

Consider a hypothetical noiseless subjective EV maximizer Bob with equal priors over ticket colors: His expected
probability of receiving $25 in our design would have been 0.518056 (and otherwise zero). Now assume a sample of
79 Bobs: Simulation of a million such samples show that average earnings of those 79 Bobs will exceed $11.01 in
93% of those samples. Now consider a hypothetical random chooser Ted: His probability of receiving $25 would be
0.492361 in our design, and the average earnings of 79 Teds will exceeded $11.01 in 84% of samples.
6
The planned sample was 80 subjects. One subject failed to show for the final session.
7
Each of the five experimental sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes (in keeping with recruitment promising
that sessions would be less than two hours).
10

Table 1. Summary of Experimental Design Pair Variations
Option A
Option B
Red
Blue
Red
Blue
ticket
ticket
ticket
ticket
basic pair # $25 $0 $25 $0 $25 $0 $25 $0
1
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 3/4 1/4 1/4 3/4
2
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
0
0
1
3
2/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1
0 1/3 2/3
4
1/3 2/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 1/3 0
1
5
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
0 1/4 3/4
6
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
0 1/3 2/3
7
1/3 2/3 1/3 2/3 1/2 1/2 0
1
8
2/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 1
0
0
1
9
2/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 1
0 1/3 2/3
10
1/2 1/2 1/3 2/3 1
0
0
1
11
1/2 1/2 1/3 2/3 3/4 1/4 0
1

Trials of each basic pair
Minimal
Transparent
frame
frame
A on top B on top
A on top
2
1
1
1
0
1
2
1
1
2
0
1
2
1
0
3
0
0
2
1
0
2
0
0
1
0
0
2
1
0
1
1
0

Notes: The first eight columns show the state-contingent lotteries associated with each of the two ticket color states
within each pair of options. Fractions below each outcome in each state-contingent lottery are outcome probabilities.
The total trials in each variation, shown in the right three columns, sum to thirty choice situations: For each one of
these situations, there was a corresponding situation with the options’ state-contingent lottery assignment of red and
blue ticket colors reversed. This totals sixty choice situations.

raffle tickets, and that the mixture could differ across their bags. Subjects were never permitted
to look in their bag, and made one blind draw from their bag at the end of their session.8
Experimental instructions were read aloud to subjects while they followed along in their own
copies of the instruction booklet. Figure 2 (from Section 2) shows Basic Pair 1 in minimal and
transparent frames, exactly as these were presented to subjects in the experiment. As shown in
the figure, both minimal and transparent frames were monotonic in that payoffs decreased
(weakly) monotonically from left to right. All presentations used the same table format with the
column “N/12” denoting the number of die rolls (from a twelve-sided die) yielding the payoff in
the column to the left: Die rolls corresponding to each payoff increased from left to right.9 After
explaining all facts concerning the decision representation, subjects were quizzed for their
understanding of how random events (ticket draws and die rolls) would determine payouts given
8

For interpretation of results and estimation we assume that any prior probabilities subjects place on the red and
blue ticket states are constant across their choice situations. Our placement of the bags with the subjects, from the
start to the finish of their session, is meant to make this assumption plausible.
9
For instance, in Option B in Basic Pair 1, any die roll between 1 and 9 paid $25 and any die roll between 10 and 12
paid $0 if a red ticket was drawn. Likewise, any die roll between 1 and 3 paid $25 and any die roll between 4 and 12
paid $0 if a blue ticket was drawn.
11

choices: Subjects’ answers were individually checked, and any errors explained to them. Then
subjects were quizzed once more, and any errors (very rare at that point) were again individually
explained to each subject. An attendant then read a final overview of the events that would take
place during the session, and the session commenced as described above.

4.1 Explanation of Design Features and Assumptions
For every choice situation with the assignment of lotteries to states as shown in the eight lefthand columns of Table 1, there was a corresponding choice situation with this assignment of
lotteries to states (ticket colors) reversed. This counter-balancing serves two purposes. First, it
helps neutralize any suspicion a subject might have that the contents of their ticket bag is
‘rigged’ to minimize experimenter payout. Second, the counter-balancing of lotteries to states is
needed to infer whether the subject acts as if she assigns coherent probabilities to the red ticket
and blue ticket states (in the same manner Ellsberg’s two-color paradox tests SEU). For instance,
in pair 1 an SEU agent who prefers B to A when the preferred lottery in Option B (the 75%
chance of winning $25) is assigned to the red ticket state, is acting as-if her subjective
probability of the red ticket state is greater than 0.50. The same agent should then prefer A to B
when the preferred lottery in Option B is instead assigned to the blue ticket state.
In Table 1, basic pairs 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 and 4 are Ellsberg-style choices in that (i) they involve a
choice between a constant act 𝐴 (which yields the same lottery regardless of the state) and an
ambiguous act 𝐵 (which assigns different lotteries to different states) and (ii) both options in
each of these pairs have the same expected payout if the decision maker assigns a coherent
uniform prior over states. These four basic pairs are our focus: 26 of the 60 situations 𝑠 are trials
of these pairs (18 minimal frame trials and 8 transparent frame trials). Section A2 of our
Appendix shows that, for basic pairs 1 to 4, the Hurwicz-SWUP model predicts decreased
ambiguity aversion in transparent (versus minimal) frames. Choice pairs 5 through 11 are only
presented in minimal frames: These provide extra information needed for structural estimation10
10

In the econometrics of risk and uncertainty, structural estimation at the individual subject level benefits strongly
from choice problems which challenge the boundaries of each subject’s attitudes toward risk and/or ambiguity. Thus
the inclusion of a range of choice problems, some that tempt even relatively ambiguity-averse subjects to choose the
ambiguous option (e.g. Option B in basic pair 6) add significant information concerning preferences. Minimal
frames predominate in our design. This enables the “generalization criterion” analysis we perform below in Section
5.3. Additionally, note that transparent frames provide no information about probability salience functions 𝜓Ρ : In
other work based on these data, we plan to test properties of these particular salience functions.
12

and act as spacing trials between repeated trials of the central pairs 1 to 4. As shown in Table 1,
there were two possible outcomes for each subject: They could receive either $25 or $0.
Restricting payouts to two possible outcomes, as in Ellsberg’s paradoxes, allows us to test some
hypotheses without knowledge of risk attitudes.11
Especially in Basic Pairs 1, 2, 3 and 4, we wish to interpret the indifference response, which
is a 50:50 randomization between options 𝐴 and 𝐵, as actual indifference between them. To do
so, we need the “certainty betweenness” property described by Grant and Polak (2013). Using
our experimental term “options” rather than the more usual term “acts,” we can state this
property as follows. Let Ω denote the set of states 𝜔 and let 𝑍 denote the set of outcomes 𝑧. An
objective lottery is a known probability distribution 𝑝 on 𝑍. Denote the set of objective lotteries
by 𝒫(𝑍). An option, 𝑋, is a mapping 𝑋: Ω → 𝒫(𝑍) which assigns an objective lottery 𝑋(𝜔) to
each state 𝜔. A “constant option” 𝐾 assigns the same objective lottery to every state, and an
“ambiguous option” assigns distinct objective lotteries to at least two states. Denote the set of all
options by 𝕆. Certainty betweenness assumes that indifference between a constant option 𝐾 and
any other option 𝑋 implies indifference between the constant option and any probabilistic
mixture of the constant option and the other option:
Axiom (Certainty Betweenness): For any option 𝑋 ∈ 𝕆, and any constant option 𝐾 ∈ 𝕆,
and any 𝛿 ∈ (0,1): 𝑋 ~ 𝐾 ⇒ 𝛼𝑋 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐾 ~ 𝐾.

In the presence of their other axioms, Certainty Betweenness is implied by the certainty
independence axiom Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) assumed in their multiple priors model. The
subset of Grant and Polak’s monotone mean-dispersion preferences which satisfy certainty
betweenness and Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) uncertainty aversion axiom is the class of
multiple priors preferences (Grant and Polak 2013, p. 1369, Corollary 3).
Certainty betweenness can be applied to basic pairs 1 through 7 in Table 1 since they involve
a choice between a constant option (option A) and an ambiguous option (option B). Since our
focus is on basic pairs 1 through 4, we will treat certainty betweenness as a maintained
hypothesis throughout our study. In our data analyses, we therefore restrict attention to theories
11

Computation of ambiguity premia requires knowledge of von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) functions, but
below we find that some interesting features of ambiguity premia are fairly robust to curvature of vNM functions.
13

of ambiguity aversion which satisfies certainty betweenness: In particular, our structural
econometrics compares Hurwicz-SWUP to both Hurwicz preferences and the “mean-standard
deviation” or MSD preferences described in Grant and Kajii (2007) and Grant and Polak
(2013).12 In Section A2 of our Appendix we demonstrate that SWUP satisfies certainty
betweenness if the salience functions exhibit homogeneity of degree 0, a property that Bordalo et
al. (2013) argue is plausible for a salience function and which they invoke in their analysis of
salience effects in consumer choice. Since the framing effect between minimal and transparent
frames is predicted under general conditions by SWUP (for any salience function) it also holds
for the class of salience functions exhibiting homogeneity of degree zero.
Random selection of just one of each subject’s several choices by means of a random device
(such as a draw from a card deck) goes under various names: We call it random task selection.
Currently, we think the balance of experimental evidence suggests that when each of several
tasks is presented separately (on its own page of a booklet, or on its own computer screen—this
is important), random task selection produces incentive-compatible choices.13 Brown and Healy
(2018) discuss existing evidence and their own new experimental evidence supporting this claim.

5. Results
Our experimental design varied the assignment of ticket colors to objective lotteries to better
test SEU; additionally, we also vary whether the more ambiguous act is in the top or bottom row
of the choice table displayed to subjects (to check for response set), and the order in which the
choice situations are presented to subjects (to check for learning and/or fatigue). Appendix A1.2
describes an initial estimation that checks on these matters. We find no significant evidence of
row placement of options or situation order, so we proceed ignoring these things. The assignment
of ticket color to objective lotteries has no systematic effect across subjects. This does not mean
all individual subjects have equal subjective priors of each ticket state: Different subjects could

12

MSD preferences include many other preferences. Grant and Polak show that since the standard deviation
dispersion function is non-negative, convex, symmetric, and satisfies certainty betweenness, MSD preferences have
a corresponding representation in the vector expected utility model (Siniscalchi, 2009), the invariant biseparable
representation (Ghirardato et al., 2004), and the multiple prior representation (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989)
provided that the mean-standard deviation preferences are monotone (a property we impose on our estimations of
MSD preferences, though this monotonicity constraint rarely binds at the level of individual subjects).
13
By “incentive-compatible” we mean that the subject’s choice in any one of the several tasks will be equivalent to
the choice the subject would have made in that task if that task had been the sole task presented to the subject.
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still believe that a red (or blue) ticket draw is more likely than blue (or red). So where we
estimate any structural model containing subjective priors we will still estimate those priors.
Section 5.1 describes results for pairs 1, 2, 3 and 4, plotting the data and performing very
simple statistics, to compare results in minimal and transparent frames. Section 5.2 estimates an
aggregate Hurwicz model of the data, allowed to depend on frames, to contrast “ambiguity
premia” in transparent and minimal frames. We then perform disaggregated, subject-by-subject
econometrics in Section 5.3, showing that the Hurwicz-SWUP model outperforms two
alternatives (Hurwicz criterion and MSD) in predicting choices in transparent frames using only
choices in minimal frames.

5.1 Establishing the Treatment Effect: Minimal Versus Transparent Frames.
For the purpose of comparing subjects’ choice behavior between minimal and transparent
𝑒
frames in basic pairs 𝑗 = 1 to 4, define a dependent variable 𝑐𝑙𝑗
taking values

𝑒
𝑐𝑙𝑗

1
= 0.5
0

if subject 𝑒 chose the constant option in trial 𝑙 of pair 𝑗;
if subject 𝑒 chose indifference in trial 𝑙 of pair 𝑗; and
if subject 𝑒 chose the ambiguous option in trial 𝑙 of pair 𝑗.

Empirically, given trials 𝑙 satisfying some condition ℂ, we take ambiguity neutrality to mean that
𝑒
𝑒
𝑒
𝐸(𝑐𝑙𝑗
|ℂ) = 0.5 in basic pairs 𝑗 = 1 to 4. Similarly, we take 𝐸(𝑐𝑙𝑗
|ℂ) > 0.5 and 𝐸(𝑐𝑙𝑗
|ℂ) < 0.5

to mean ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking, respectively, given condition ℂ. Let 𝑀 and 𝑇
denote the sets of minimal and transparent frame trials 𝑙 of pairs 𝑗 = 1 to 4, respectively. The
𝑒
𝑒
Hurwicz-SWUP prediction is that the framing effect 𝐹 𝑒 = 𝐸(𝑐𝑙𝑗
|𝑙𝑗 ∈ 𝑀) − 𝐸(𝑐𝑙𝑗
|𝑙𝑗 ∈ 𝑇) > 0.
𝑒
𝑒
𝑒
The sample analogues of the expectations in 𝐹 𝑒 are 𝑐̅𝑀
= ∑𝑙𝑗∈𝑀 𝑐𝑙𝑗
/18 and 𝑐̅𝑇𝑒 = ∑𝑙𝑗∈𝑇 𝑐𝑙𝑗
/8,
𝑒
𝑒
yielding an estimate 𝐹̂ 𝑒 = 𝑐̅𝑀
− 𝑐̅𝑇𝑒 of 𝐹 𝑒 for each subject 𝑒. Figure 6 plots pairs (𝑐̅𝑀
, 𝑐̅𝑇𝑒 ) for the

79 subjects (𝐹̂ 𝑒 > 0 for pairs below the 45 degree line), and Figure 7 shows the cumulative
sample distribution of 𝐹̂ 𝑒 : By a sign test (and other applicable tests),14 this distribution’s location
is easily statistically different from zero. The Hurwicz-SWUP prediction easily holds.

14

For every sign test result reported in this article, we also calculated results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test and a
paired sample t-test: Those two tests always yield still smaller p-values than the sign tests do.
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Transparent frames choice
proportions

1

𝑐𝑇

Minimal frames choice proportions 1

𝑐𝑀

Figure 6. Minimal and transparent frame choice proportions, pairs 1 to 4.
Notes: Smallest (largest) bubbles are one (six) subjects.

Cumulative Subjects

79

0
-0.25

50 positive
8 zero
21 negative
sign test p = 0.0008
0

0.25
Framing effect

0.5

Figure 7. Cumulative distribution of estimated framing effects 𝐹̂ 𝑒 .
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Figure 8. Estimated distributions of Hurwicz 𝛼 in minimal and transparent frame trials:
Random parameters estimation using the Hurwicz criterion representation.

5.2 Comparing Ambiguity Aversion and Premia Across Minimal and Transparent Frames
Structural estimation—that is, estimation of parameters found in decision-theoretic
representations—provides another quantification of differences in ambiguity aversion across the
two types of frames. We do this using eq. 4, the simple Hurwizc criterion, with a
parameterization allowing the Hurwicz 𝛼 to vary across the two types of frames and across
subjects as well. Appendix section A1.3 discusses this random parameters estimation of the
distribution of the Hurwicz 𝛼 parameter in our sampled population, which is based on subjects’
choices in all sixty choice situations. We estimate mean values of 𝛼 equal to 0.370 (standard
error 0.011) and 0.438 (standard error 0.010) in minimal and transparent frame choices,
respectively. The random parameters method also produces estimates of the distributions of 𝛼
conditional on frame type: Figure 8 shows these two estimated distributions.
Our experiment uses just two outcomes ($25 and $0) in all options, so we cannot estimate
curvature of subjects’ underlying vNM (von Neumann and Morgenstern, or Bernoulli) utilities of

17

outcomes: Therefore estimates of cash equivalents of options is not possible. However, we can
report some interesting characteristics of cash equivalents that hold across a wide range of utility
curvatures (including those most scholars take seriously). In particular, the percentage increase in
ambiguity premia due to minimal frames (versus transparent frames) is almost certainly quite
substantial and fairly insensitive to assumed curvature of vNM utilities.
Using the Hurwicz criterion, implicitly define cash equivalents 𝐶𝐸(𝑋|𝛼) of options 𝑋 as
(6)

𝜔

𝜔

𝑢[𝐶𝐸(𝑋|𝛼)] = 𝛼 max𝜔∈Ω ∑𝑛𝑖 𝑝𝑖𝜔 𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝜔 ) + (1 − 𝛼) min𝜔∈Ω ∑𝑛𝑖 𝑝𝑖𝜔 𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝜔 ).

Note that 𝛼 = 0.5 has special status. It weighs the best and worst expected utilities equally of
course, but when there are just two states (as in all our options) and 𝛼 = 0.5, the Hurwicz
criterion is mathematically identical to SEU with uniform priors over the two states. This implies
that when there are just two states, 𝐶𝐸(𝑋|0.5) is the cash equivalent of an ambiguity neutral
SEU agent who regards the two states as equally likely. Therefore, we define an ambiguity
premium 𝜛(𝑋|𝛼) = 𝐶𝐸(𝑋|0.5) − 𝐶𝐸(𝑋|𝛼) that a Hurwicz criterion agent (with optimism
parameter 𝛼) attaches to ambiguous option 𝑋.15
Table 2 shows this ambiguity premium for ambiguous option 𝐵 in basic pairs 1 to 4, given
our estimated mean values of 𝛼 in minimal and transparent frame choices, and assuming four
different amounts of vNM utility curvature. This table also shows the difference 𝜛(𝐵|0.370) −
𝜛(𝐵|0.438) between the estimated ambiguity premia in minimal and transparent frame choices
and a quantity we call the “minimal frame markup” 100 ∙ [𝜛(𝐵|0.370) − 𝜛(𝐵|0.438)]/
𝜛(𝐵|0.438), our estimated percentage increase in ambiguity premia between minimal and
transparent frames. Table 2 shows that although the ambiguity premia themselves vary quite a bit
with changes in vNM utility curvature, the minimal frame markup stays in a reasonably small
neighborhood of 100%. Regardless of vNM curvature, changing from transparent to minimal
frames roughly doubles our subjects’ estimated ambiguity premium for ambiguous options.

5.3 Predicting Transparent Frame Behavior from Minimal Frame Behavior
The Hurwicz-SWUP representation motivated the predictions we tested in Section 5.1
concerning differences between behavior in minimal and transparent frames. There is another
Let 𝑆𝐸𝑉(𝑋) denote the subjective expected value of option 𝑋 under equal priors 𝜋 𝑟 = 𝜋 𝑏 = 0.5. Define the total
premium 𝑆𝐸𝑉(𝑋) − 𝐶𝐸(𝑋|𝛼) and the risk premium 𝑆𝐸𝑉(𝑋) − 𝐶𝐸(𝑋|0.5). Our definition of the ambiguity
premium simply decomposes the total premium into the sum of the risk premium and ambiguity premium.
15
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Table 2. Ambiguity Premia in Minimal and Transparent Frames (Basic Pairs 1-4)
Option B in Pair 𝑗 = …
1
2
3

4

ambiguous option
subjective expected valuea

$12.50

$12.50

$16.67

$8.33

25

ϖ (minimal frames)
ϖ (transparent frames)
difference
minimal frame markup

$1.63
$0.78
$0.85
109%

$3.26
$1.55
$1.71
110%

$2.17
$1.04
$1.13
109%

$2.17
$1.04
$1.13
109%

25

ϖ (minimal frames)
ϖ (transparent frames)
difference
minimal frame markup

$1.56
$0.76
$0.80
105%

$2.97
$1.49
$1.48
99%

$2.53
$1.24
$1.29
104%

$1.56
$0.77
$0.79
103%

25

ϖ (minimal frames)
ϖ (transparent frames)
difference
minimal frame markup

$0.98
$0.49
$0.49
100%

$1.76
$0.93
$0.83
89%

$2.16
$1.11
$1.05
95%

$0.73
$0.37
$0.36
97%

25

ϖ (minimal frames)
ϖ (transparent frames)
difference
minimal frame markup

$0.43
$0.22
$0.21
95%

$0.77
$0.41
$0.36
88%

$1.14
$0.60
$0.54
90%

$0.31
$0.16
$0.15
94%

vNM utility curvatureb
1

0
0

1

0
0

1

0
0

1

0
0

Notes: aUnder the assumption of equal subjective priors ( 𝜋 𝑟 = 𝜋 𝑏 = 0.5). bThe assumed utility of outcomes is
𝑢(𝑧|𝜅) = [−1 + (1 + 𝑧)(1−𝜅) ]⁄[−1 + 26(1−𝜅) ] for 𝜅 ≠ 1 and 𝑢(𝑧|𝜅) = ln(1 + 𝑧) /ln(26) at 𝜅 = 1: This maps the
outcome range [$0,$25] onto the unit interval. This is a HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) utility function:
For 𝜅 > 0, it exhibits declining absolute risk aversion but increasing relative risk aversion. This utility function has
the property that 𝑢(0|𝜅) = 0 ∀ 𝜅 ∈ ℝ, a property not shared by the CRRA (power) utility functions, as is required
for SWUP, RDU and CPT.

way to test such predictions known as the “generalization criterion” (Busemeyer and Wang
2000). This test estimates parameters of two or more preference representations using only
minimal frame observations and uses those estimates to predict transparent frame observations.
Here we will index the dependent variable defined in Section 5.1 by situations 𝑠 instead of trials
𝑒
and pairs (writing 𝑐𝑠𝑒 instead of 𝑐𝑙𝑗
). Let 𝒮 ∈ {ℳ, 𝒯} index the two mutually exclusive and

exhaustive subsets ℳ (minimal frame situations) and 𝒯 (transparent frame situations) of the
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sixty experimental situations s. Let 𝜏 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐻𝑆, 𝑀𝑆𝐷} index the theory representations (Hurwicz
criterion, Hurwicz-SWUP, and Mean-Standard Deviation, respectively) we examine here; let 𝜃 𝜏
𝜏,𝑒
be the parameter vector of each theory representation 𝜏; and let 𝜃̂ℳ
be an estimate of 𝜃 𝜏 based
𝜏,𝑒
only on subject 𝑒’s choices in the fifty-two minimal frame situations 𝑠 ∈ ℳ. We estimate 𝜃̂ℳ
𝜏,𝑒
(𝜃 𝜏 ) in a choice of 𝜃 𝜏 specific to each subject 𝑒.
by maximizing subject 𝑒’s log likelihood ℒℳ
𝜏,𝑒
𝜏,𝑒 ̂ 𝜏,𝑒
We refer to 𝜃̂ℳ
as the “in-sample estimate” and ℒℳ
(𝜃ℳ ) as the “in-sample fit” for subject 𝑒,

given theory 𝜏. Appendix A1.3 discusses details of this estimation.
𝜏,𝑒
The generalization criterion computes the “out-of-sample fit” ℒ𝒯𝜏,𝑒 (𝜃̂ℳ
) using the in-sample

estimate and compares theories 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 by the difference between their out-of-sample fits: That
𝒴,𝑒
𝒴,𝑒
𝜏 ,𝑒
𝜏 ,𝑒
is, the generalization criterion for subject 𝑒 is 𝐺 𝑒 (𝜏1 , 𝜏2 ) = 2[ℒ𝒯1 (𝜃̂ℳ1 ) − ℒ𝒯 (𝜃̂ℳ )].

Figures 9 and 10 show the cumulative distributions of 𝐺 𝑒 (𝐻𝑆, 𝐻) and 𝐺 𝑒 (𝐻𝑆, 𝑀𝑆𝐷),
respectively, across our seventy-nine subjects. For comparison we also show cumulative
distributions of 𝐷𝐴𝐼𝐶 𝑒 (𝐻𝑆, 𝐻) and 𝐷𝐴𝐼𝐶 𝑒 (𝐻𝑆, 𝑀𝑆𝐷) in the two figures. These are “in-sample
fit” comparisons measured by differences between the Akaike (1973) Information Criterion:
𝜏 ,𝑒
𝜏 ,𝑒
𝜏 ,𝑒
𝜏 ,𝑒
𝐷𝐴𝐼𝐶 𝑒 (𝜏1 , 𝜏2 ) = 2[ℒℳ1 (𝜃̂ℳ1 ) − ℒℳ2 (𝜃̂ℳ2 )] − 2∆𝑘 𝜏1 ,𝜏2 , where ∆𝑘 𝜏1 ,𝜏2 is the difference

between the number of parameters in 𝜃 𝜏1 and 𝜃 𝜏2 .16 Judged by 𝐷𝐴𝐼𝐶 𝑒 (in-sample fit for minimal
frame observations) there is no statistically significant difference between the Hurwicz-SWUP
criterion and either the Hurwicz criterion or Mean-Standard Deviation preferences. However, the
Hurwicz-SWUP criterion clearly outperforms these two competitors in out-of-sample prediction
according to the generalization criterion.

6. Conclusions
Motivated by a new model of ambiguity aversion and by the success of Savage’s conjecture
in predicting the frame-dependence of the Allais paradox for choice under risk, we tested for an
influence of framing on Ellsberg’s paradox in decisions under uncertainty. We observed a
highly significant framing effect in the direction predicted by the Hurwicz-SWUP criterion
motivated by Leland and Schneider’s (2016) SWUP criterion.
One sometimes thinks of ∆𝑘 𝒳,𝒴 as a penalty for relative lack of parsimony. More accurately, it is due to a
difference in degrees of freedom lost because the very observations used to compute fit were also used to estimate
parameters. This explains why the generalization criterion has no such “penalty:” Observations used to calculate fit
(those in 𝒯) were not used to estimate 𝜃 ℛ (that estimation used only observations in ℳ).
16
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79
Cumulative Subjects

35 positive
6 zero
38 negative

sign test p = 0.82

51 positive
4 zero
24 negative
sign test p = 0.0024

0
-10

-5
0
5
In-sample (DAIC)
Out-of-sample (G)

10

Figure 9. In-sample and out-of-sample fit comparison between
Hurwicz-SWUP and Hurwicz criterion representations.

79

Cumulative Subjects

46 positive
0 zero
33 negative
sign test p = 0.18
49 positive
4 zero
26 negative
sign test p = 0.011

0
-10

-5
0
In-sample (DAIC)

5
Out-of-sample (G)

10

Figure 10. In-sample and out-of-sample fit comparison between
Hurwicz-SWUP criterion and Mean-Standard Deviation representations.
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One important question warranting further investigation concerns the precise locus of the
treatment effect. Our hypothesis is that minimal frames hamper “true” preference expression
(while transparent frames do not): Transparent frames make common consequences of all
options clearly visible, focus attention on remaining differences between options, and therefore
enhancing the sure-thing principle’s descriptive drawing power. An opposite hypothesis, based
on Chew et al. (2017), is that subjects are “truly” ambiguity averse and transparent frames
hamper their recognition of ambiguity (while minimal frames do not). Put differently, it might be
that our framing effect does not decrease ambiguity aversion, but rather increases the noise
inherent in the decisions of subjects who are truly ambiguity-averse. Using econometric
modeling similar to that discussed in Sections A1.1 and A1.3 in our Appendix, we explored this
and think those results suggest that transparent frames do not increase decision noise.17
As noted in Section 2, a variety of fairly recent studies have investigated whether the Allais
paradox is susceptible to framing. All of these studies (Leland, 2010; Bordalo et al., 2012;
Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher, 2012; Birnbaum and Schmidt, 2015; Harman and Gonzalez, 2015)
find significantly fewer violations of the independence axiom of expected utility theory, when
the lotteries are recast from minimal frames (i.e., the standard ‘prospect’ presentation format) to
transparent frames (i.e., the Savage matrix format). While the Ellsberg paradox violates a similar
independence postulate, no such experiment has been conducted for ambiguity attitudes. In the
present experiment, we find that the same types of frames which reduce Allais-type violations of
objective expected utility theory also reduce ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg-type decision
situations. This is in keeping with Leland and Schneider’s (2016) formalization of different kinds
of frames and the decision algorithms that may operate on those frames.

17

This long analysis cannot be include here (the third author will provide it on request). Its essence is to allow both
parameters governing attitude toward ambiguity, and probabilistic model parameters governing the noisiness of
decisions, to depend on whether a situation is in a minimal or transparent frame. We did this using the MeanStandard Deviation theory, both with and without random parameter controls for heterogeneity across subjects. No
specification uncovers significant increases in the noisiness of our subjects’ decisions in transparent frames and, in
all of those specifications, we find a significant decrease in their ambiguity aversion in transparent frames.
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Appendix
A1. Econometric Analysis
A1.1 The Probability of Indifference Responses
Recall from Section 3 that in each choice situation 𝑠 = 1 to 60, subjects may choose either
Option A or Option B from a pair shown in Table 1, or may report indifference (which is
resolved by a coin flip). Denote these three alternatives in situation 𝑠 by 𝑠𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵, ~}, and let
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝑣𝑠𝑘
∈ {𝑣𝑠𝐴
, 𝑣𝑠𝐵
, 𝑣𝑠~
} denote their values according to some deterministic theory 𝜏’s
𝜏
representation theorem. Then a Luce model of choice probabilities 𝑄𝑠𝑘
would be

(A1)

𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝑄𝑠𝐴
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑣𝑠𝐴
)/𝐷𝑠𝜏 , 𝑄𝑠~
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑣𝑠~
)/𝐷𝑠𝜏 , and 𝑄𝑠𝐵
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑣𝑠𝐵
)/𝐷𝑠𝜏 ,
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
where 𝐷𝑠𝜏 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑣𝑠𝐴
) + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑣𝑠~
) + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑣𝑠𝐵
),

and 𝜆 is a scale parameter, sometimes called “precision” or “sensitivity” (as 𝜆 → ∞ the decision
maker chooses the highest value alternative with certainty, and as 𝜆 → 0 the decision maker
chooses each of the three alternatives with one-third probability).
This approach to our data predicts far too many indifference responses. To solve this problem
𝜏
we reinterpret the 𝑄𝑠𝑘
in eq. A1 as “preference state probabilities”—probabilities that a subject

finds herself in one of three “preference states” after choice deliberation (just before she
responds). Conditional on being in the “indifference state,” we assume she chooses the
indifference response with probability 𝜙, or chooses either A or B—each with probabilities
(1 − 𝜙)/2. This allows the subjects’ observed probability of indifference responses to be rarer
than the Luce model predicts but enforces the compelling notion that an agent in an indifferent
state favors neither the A nor B response. However, conditional on being in the “prefer A state”
or the “prefer B state,” she responds by choosing her preferred option with certainty. Now let
𝜏
𝑃𝑠𝑘
, 𝑘 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵, ~}, denote “response probabilities:” Our assumptions yield a one-parameter

generalization of the Luce choice model allowing for “rare” indifference responses:
(A2)

𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝑃𝑠𝐴
= 𝑄𝑠𝐴
+ 0.5(1 − 𝜙)𝑄𝑠~
; 𝑃𝑠~
= 𝜙𝑄𝑠~
; and 𝑃𝑠𝐵
= 𝑄𝑠𝐵
+ 0.5(1 − 𝜙)𝑄𝑠~
.

Equations A1 and A2 are the basis of our probabilistic choice models for our econometrics—
with some variations of eq. A1 described below.
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A1.2 Checks for Significant Nuisance Variance
Recall that the experimental design features some standard variations meant to check for, and
control, several potential artifactual effects: We switched the rows in which options were
displayed, and also changed the order in which the pairs were presented. The hope is always that
these kinds of variations have no statistically significant impact on choices. We also switched the
assignment of ticket colors to states (for reasons described in Section 4). In this section we
perform a statistical analysis meant to check whether any of these three variations have
unanticipated effects.
𝜏
Dividing all terms in eq. A1 by 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆𝑣𝑠𝐵
) yields this new and useful expression of

preference state probabilities:
(A3)

𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝑄𝑠𝐴
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(𝑣𝑠𝐴
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)]/𝐷𝑠𝜏 , 𝑄𝑠~
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(𝑣𝑠~
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)]/𝐷𝑠𝜏 , and 𝑄𝑠𝐵
= 1/𝐷𝑠𝜏 ,
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
where 𝐷𝑠𝜏 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(𝑣𝑠𝐴
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)] + 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(𝑣𝑠~
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)] + 1.

We always assume that subjects’ preferences obey the certainty betweenness axiom (Section 4.1
explained that the experimental design was predicated on this). In basic pairs 1 through 7 (where
A is a constant option and B is an ambiguous option) this assumption (along with the
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
experimental design) implies that indifference responses have value 𝑣𝑠~
= (𝑣𝑠𝐴
+ 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)/2.

However, options A and B are both ambiguous in basic pairs 8 through 11 so the certainty
betweenness axiom does not apply: In those pairs there may be a diversification motive giving
indifference responses increased value. Here we approximate this motive by a constant
“diversification utility” 𝜁 common to pairs 8 through 11 (in structural estimations the
diversification motive is modeled in an explicit theoretical way without 𝜁). Therefore, in this
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
section’s estimation, we have 𝑣𝑠~
= (𝑣𝑠𝐴
+ 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)/2 + 𝜁 and 𝑣𝑠~
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
= (𝑣𝑠𝐴
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)/2 + 𝜁
𝜏
𝜏
(where 𝛿 is zero in pairs 1 through 7). Also let Δ𝑣𝑠𝜏 ≡ 𝑣𝑠𝐴
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
, and eq. A3 may then be

rewritten to give this modified version of the preference state probabilities:
(A4)

𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝑄𝑠𝐴
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆Δ𝑣𝜏𝑠 )/𝐷𝑠𝜏 , 𝑄𝑠~
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(Δ𝑣𝜏𝑠 /2 + 𝜁)]/𝐷𝑠𝜏 , and 𝑄𝑠𝐵
= 1/𝐷𝑠𝜏 ,

where 𝐷𝑠𝜏 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜆Δ𝑣𝑠𝜏 ) + 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(Δ𝑣𝑠𝜏 /2 + 𝜁)] + 1,
and 𝜁 = 0 in pairs 1 through 7.
This formulation (along with eq. A2) is appealing since Δ𝑣𝑠𝜏 is simply the difference between the
values of Option A and Option B. The estimation in this section simply makes Δ𝑣𝑠𝜏 a linear
function of pair indicators and indicators for all experimentally induced sources of variance in
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responses—along with a random (normally distributed, zero mean) effect to account for subjectspecific heterogeneity. As is well-known, scale 𝜆 is not separately identifiable in linear latent
variable formulations such as this; so here, we set 𝜆 = 1. The results of the first estimation are
summarized below in Table A1.1, with interpretations of these results following the table.
Table A1.1 Analysis of Effects of Experimentally Induced Sources of Potential Variance
Meaning of estimated parameters
standard deviation of subject-specific random effects
A. effect of transparent frames (in pairs 1, 2, 3, and 4)
B. effect of switching red and blue ticket assignment
C. effect of switching top and bottom row assignment
D1. order effect—pair presented in first (of three) booklets
D3. order effect—pair presented in last (of three) booklets
pair 1 indicator effect
pair 2 indicator effect
pair 3 indicator effect
pair 4 indicator effect
pair 5 indicator effect
pair 6 indicator effect
pair 7 indicator effect
pair 8 indicator effect
pair 9 indicator effect
pair 10 indicator effect
pair 11 indicator effect
Indifference response probability 𝜙 (all pairs)
Diversification utility 𝜁 (in pairs 8, 9, 10, and 11)

Estimates Std. Errora
1.5
–1.0
0.087
–0.074
–0.069
0.0098
2.3
2.6
2.2
2.1
–0.71
–2.9
4.2
2.6
–0.20
1.0
4.0
0.33
–0.68

0.23
0.20
0.16
0.16
0.11
0.11
0.42
0.44
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.48
0.52
0.47
0.43
0.39
0.46
0.069
0.25

p-valueb
mc
< 0.0001
0.60
0.65
0.52
0.93
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
0.088
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
< 0.0001
0.64
0.011
< 0.0001
mc
0.0097

Notes: aWe use a standard robust “sandwich estimator” to estimate the covariance matrix of parameter estimates.
b
Against the hypothesis that the true coefficient equals zero. cThe “m” means that a p-value would be misleading in
this case, since the natural null hypothesis (that the parameter equals zero) lies on the boundary of the parameter’s
allowable space (the parameters in question are first a variance and second a probability).

Row A. This row presents the estimated deviation from the pair indicators (restricted to basic
pairs 1 through 4) due to transparent versus minimal framing. It is negative and highly
significant: Transparent frames reduced ambiguity aversion as predicted.
Row B. Every pair was presented in two ways, with either the red ticket or the blue ticket being
the better state in the relatively ambiguous option. The insignificance of this effect says that there
is no mean effect on ambiguous choices of this manipulation, suggesting that on average,
subjects have equal priors of red and blue ticket states.
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Row C. In the presentations of the choice situations it is usually true that the top row of each
presentation is option A while the bottom row is option B, but in twelve of the sixty choice
situations this was reversed. Row C shows that this effect is statistically insignificant, suggesting
that we have no empirically important “response set” issue in our experiment.
Rows D1 and D3. We grouped our sixty choice situations into three booklets of twenty
situations each and systematically varied the order in which subjects encountered the three
booklets, so that each booklet was either the first, second or third booklet subjects encountered.
The insignificance of these two effects suggests that we have no appreciable order effects.
Pair indicator effects. All the effects described above, except the framing effect, are
parameterized as deviations from the estimated pair indicator effects (when presented in minimal
𝜏
𝜏
frames). So each pair indicator effect is interpreted as Δ𝑣𝑠𝜏 ≡ 𝑣𝑠𝐴
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
under minimal framing.

A significantly positive (negative) value of a pair intercept means that, on average, subjects
prefer Option A (Option B) in that pair when presented in a minimal frame. The only pairs (5, 6
and 9) with negative estimates are pairs where Option B (the relatively ambiguous option) has an
appreciably higher subjective expected value under the assumption of equal prior probabilities
assigned to states (ticket colors).
Indifferent response probability. Across all subjects, this estimate suggests that when subjects
find themselves in the indifferent preference state, they choose each of the three possible
responses (A, B or ~) with nearly equal one-third probabilities.
Diversification utility. The negative sign and statistical significance of this estimate is not what
most would expect; a diversification motive implies a positive sign for this effect.

A1.3

Details of Structural Estimations Underlying Sections 5.2 and 5.3

When estimating structural models of choice under risk and uncertainty, many behavioral
econometricians now use one of several modifications of (or alternatives to, e.g. Fishburn 1978)
the Luce model of preference state probabilities in eq. A3. This is due to special econometric
issues, derived from decision-theoretic considerations, in the realm of choice under risk and
uncertainty (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993; Wilcox 2008, 2011; Blavatskyy 2011; Blavatskyy
2014). The general form of all these modifications to eq. A3 is
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(A5)

𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝑄𝑠𝐴
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(𝑣𝑠𝐴
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)/𝑁𝑠𝜏 ]/𝐷𝑠𝜏 , 𝑄𝑠~
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(𝑣𝑠~
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)/𝑁𝑠𝜏 ]/𝐷𝑠𝜏 , and 𝑄𝑠𝐵
= 1/𝐷𝑠𝜏 ,
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
where 𝐷𝑠𝜏 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(𝑣𝑠𝐴
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)/𝑁𝑠𝜏 ] + 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝜆(𝑣𝑠~
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
)/𝑁𝑠𝜏 ] + 1,

and 𝑁𝑠𝜏 is a normalization specific to each choice set (situation) 𝑠.
Our 𝑁𝑠𝜏 is a small generalization of Blavatskyy’s (2014) “Stronger Utility” normalization.
For each situation 𝑠, derive two new options 𝑠𝐴𝐵 and 𝑠𝐴𝐵 from options 𝐴 and 𝐵: option 𝑠𝐴𝐵 is
the stochastic dominance supremum of options 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵, while option 𝑠𝐴𝐵 is the stochastic
dominance infimum of options 𝐴 and 𝐵. Put differently, 𝑠𝐴𝐵 is the least desirable option that
still stochastically dominates both options 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵, while 𝑠𝐴𝐵 is the most desirable option that
is nevertheless stochastically dominated by both options 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵. Blavatskyy’s Stronger
𝜏
𝜏
Utility normalization is 𝑁𝑠𝜏 = 𝑣𝑠𝐴𝐵
− 𝑣𝑠𝐴𝐵
. Blavatskyy developed this normalization for use with

decision-theoretic representations that assign values to alternatives. We generalize it to decisiontheoretic representations that are comparative (such as SWUP and Hurwicz-SWUP): For
instance the normalization becomes 𝑁𝑠𝐻𝑆 = 𝑆(𝑠𝐴𝐵, 𝑠𝐴𝐵) for the comparative Hurwicz-SWUP
representation. In fact, the plausibility of this minor extension of Stronger Utility is the reason
we choose it for this particular work: We estimate both value representations and comparative
representations, and prefer a common normalization for both.
An example aids understanding of the simple construction of Blavatskyy’s “bounding
options” 𝑠𝐴𝐵 and 𝑠𝐴𝐵. Rows 2 and 3 of Table A1.2 show basic pair 1 in a minimal frame, while
rows 1 and 4 show 𝑠𝐴𝐵 and 𝑠𝐴𝐵 in this situation. One constructs 𝑠𝐴𝐵 by assigning the best
state-contingent lottery (offerred by either 𝑠𝐴 or 𝑠𝐵 in each state 𝜔) to 𝑠𝐴𝐵 in every state 𝜔;
similarly one constructs 𝑠𝐴𝐵 by assigning the worst state-contingent lottery (offerred by either
𝑠𝐴 or 𝑠𝐵 in each state 𝜔) to 𝑠𝐴𝐵 in every state 𝜔. Table A1.2 illustrates this construction.
Table A1.2 Example of Blavatskyy’s Bounding Options (Basic Pair 1, Minimal Frame)

row
1
2
3
4

option
𝑠𝐴𝐵
𝑠𝐴
𝑠𝐵
𝑠𝐴𝐵

𝜔 = 𝑟 (red ticket state)
money prob money prob
$25
0.75
$0
0.25
$25
0.50
$0
0.50
$25
0.75
$0
0.25
$25
0.50
$0
0.50

𝜔 = 𝑏 (blue ticket state)
money prob money prob
$25
0.50
$0
0.50
$25
0.50
$0
0.50
$25
0.25
$0
0.75
$25
0.25
$0
0.75
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𝜏
To avoid clutter we have so far suppressed dependence on parameters when writing 𝑣𝑠𝑘
and
𝜏
𝜏
𝑃𝑠𝑘
. We now explicitly note this dependence. Values 𝑣𝑠𝑘
(𝛽 𝜏 ) depend on any parameters 𝛽 𝜏 of
𝜏
theory representation 𝜏. The response probabilities 𝑃𝑠𝑘
(𝛽 𝜏 , 𝜆, 𝜙) inherit dependence on 𝛽 𝜏 from
𝜏
their dependence on the 𝑣𝑠𝑘
(𝛽 𝜏 ) and add dependence on the precision parameter 𝜆 and the

indifferent response probability 𝜙. So the parameter vector 𝜃 𝜏 introduced in Section 5.3 is
identical to the vector (𝛽 𝜏 , 𝜆, 𝜙). We then have the likelihood
(A6)

𝜏
𝜏
𝜏
𝐿𝜏 (𝑐𝑠𝑒 |𝜃 𝜏 ) = 𝟏(𝑐𝑠𝑒 = 1)𝑃𝑠𝐴
(𝜃 𝜏 ) + 𝟏(𝑐𝑠𝑒 = 0)𝑃𝑠𝐵
(𝜃 𝜏 ) + 𝟏(𝑐𝑠𝑒 = 0.5)𝑃𝑠~
(𝜃 𝜏 )

𝜏
of observation 𝑐𝑠𝑒 , given response probabilities 𝑃𝑠𝑘
(𝜃 𝜏 ) defined by 𝜃 𝜏 and eqs. A2 and A5.

Recall that 𝒮 ∈ {ℳ, 𝒯} indexes the sets of all minimal frame situations and all transparent frame
situations: Let the vectors 𝑐𝒮𝑒 denote all of subject 𝑒’s responses in set 𝒮, and let the vector
𝑒
𝑐 𝑒 = (𝑐ℳ
, 𝑐𝒯𝑒 ) be all sixty of subject 𝑒’s responses. Assuming independence of observations 𝑐𝑠𝑒

across 𝑠, the total likelihood of subject 𝑒’s responses is
(A7)

𝜏 𝑒 𝜏
𝜏 𝑒
𝜏 𝜏 𝑒 𝜏
𝐿𝜏 (𝑐 𝑒 |𝜃 𝜏 ) = ∏60
𝑠=1 𝐿 (𝑐𝑠 |𝜃 ) = 𝐿 (𝑐ℳ |𝜃 )𝐿 (𝑐𝒯 |𝜃 ),

where 𝐿𝜏 (𝑐𝒮𝑒 |𝜃 𝜏 ) = ∏𝑠∈𝒮 𝐿𝜏 (𝑐𝑠𝑒 |𝜃 𝜏 ).
Section 5.2 employs a particular random parameters estimation of 𝜏 = 𝐻, the Hurwicz
𝜏
criterion. Values 𝑣𝑠𝑘
(𝛽 𝜏 ) are as given by 𝐻(𝑋) in eq. 4. Since we have just two outcomes in the

experiment (allowing us to normalize their vNM utilities zero or one), 𝛽 𝜏 is just a single
parameter here, the Hurwicz optimism parameter 𝛼. However we allow 𝛼 to vary across subjects
𝛼

and frames. The logit of 𝛼 is 𝑥(𝛼) = ln [1−𝛼] and the logistic function Λ(𝑥) = [1 + 𝑒 −𝑥 ]−1 is the
inverse of 𝑥(𝛼). Let 𝜂 be a Standard Normal random variable with cumulative distribution
function Φ(𝜂). Characterize each subject by 𝜂𝑒 , a subject-specific draw of 𝜂 that is fixed across
the sixty situations in the experiment. The Section 5.2 estimation assumes that subject e’s
optimism parameter is 𝛼𝒮𝑒 = Λ[𝑥(𝛼𝒮 ) + 𝜎𝒮 𝜂𝑒 ], where 𝒮 ∈ {ℳ, 𝒯} indexes either minimal frame
or transparent frame trials. This allows both the mean 𝑥(𝛼𝒮 ) and standard deviation 𝜎𝒮 of (the
logit of) subjects’ optimism parameters to vary with frames, but requires that each subject’s
position in those two different distributions remains unchanged across the two types of frames.
In random parameters estimation one estimates the underlying 𝛼𝒮 and 𝜎𝒮 rather than
estimating individual subjects’ 𝜂𝑒 (as in a fixed effects model). To do this, the variation of 𝜂𝑒
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across subjects must be integrated out of the total likelihood: Once that is done, we get a
likelihood that depends on 𝛼𝒮 and 𝜎𝒮 rather than the 𝜂𝑒 :
(A8)

𝐿𝜏 (𝑐 𝑒 |𝛼ℳ , 𝜎ℳ , 𝛼𝒯 , 𝜎𝒯 , 𝜆, 𝜙) =
𝑒
|Λ[𝑥(𝛼𝒮 ) + 𝜎𝒮 𝑦], 𝜆, 𝜙)𝐿𝜏 (𝑐𝒯𝑒 |Λ[𝑥(𝛼𝒮 ) + 𝜎𝒮 𝑦], 𝜆, 𝜙)𝑑Φ(𝑦).
∫ℝ 𝐿𝜏 (𝑐ℳ

In practice, integrals like that shown on the right-hand-side of A8 rarely have analytical
solutions and must be approximated using numerical methods such as simulation or quadrature.
We use the Gauss-Hermite quadrature method. One then takes natural logarithms of these
approximations of A8, sums them across subjects, and maximizes this sum in the parameters
(𝛼ℳ , 𝜎ℳ , 𝛼𝒯 , 𝜎𝒯 , 𝜆, 𝜙). This generates the estimates and standard errors reported in Section 5.2 as
well as the estimated distributions of 𝛼 shown in Figure 8.
In Section 5.3 all estimations are individual subject-by-subject estimations involving no
assumptions about distributions of parameters across subjects: Every subject 𝑒 gets her own
𝑒
estimated parameter vector on the basis of her own vector 𝑐ℳ
of fifty-two responses to the
𝜏,𝑒
(𝜃 𝜏 ) ≡
choice situations 𝑠 ∈ ℳ. The log likelihood introduced in Section 5.3 is just ℒℳ
𝜏,𝑒
𝑒
|𝜃 𝜏 )]: When this is maximized in 𝜃 𝜏 , the solution is 𝜃̂ℳ
ln[𝐿𝜏 (𝑐ℳ
. We do this for three theories
𝐻
𝜏. As discussed above, Hurwicz criterion values 𝑣𝑠𝑘
(𝛽 𝐻 ) depend on just one parameter 𝛽 𝐻 = 𝛼.

Hurwicz-SWUP comparison functions 𝑆(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) (defined by eq. 5) substitute for value
𝜏
𝜏
differences 𝑣𝑠𝐴
− 𝑣𝑠𝐵
in eq. A5 and also depend on just one parameter 𝛽 𝐻𝑆 = 𝛼 since we employ

a parameter-free salience function for these estimations (see eq. A13 in Section A2 below).
Our third theory, the “Mean-Standard Deviation” theory, has this value representation for our
two-state options 𝑋:
(A9)

𝑀𝑆𝐷(𝑋) = 𝑆𝐸𝑈(𝑋|𝜋 𝑟 ) − 𝛾𝑆𝑆𝐷(𝑋|𝜋 𝑟 ), where
where 𝑆𝐸𝑈(𝑋|𝜋 𝑟 ) = 𝜋 𝑟 𝐸𝑈[𝑋(𝑟)] + (1 − 𝜋 𝑟 )𝐸𝑈[𝑋(𝑏)],
2

2

𝑆𝑆𝐷(𝑋|𝜋 𝑟 ) = √𝜋 𝑟 (𝐸𝑈[𝑋(𝑟)] − 𝑆𝐸𝑈(𝑋|𝜋 𝑟 )) + (1 − 𝜋 𝑟 )(𝐸𝑈[𝑋(𝑏)] − 𝑆𝐸𝑈(𝑋|𝜋 𝑟 )) ,
and 𝐸𝑈[𝑋(𝜔)] is the state-contingent (objective) expected utility of option 𝑋 in state 𝜔.
Because our experimental design involves just two outcomes, calculation of state-contingent
expected utilities 𝐸𝑈[𝑋(𝜔)] requires no parameter estimates. Therefore this theory has just two
parameters 𝛽 𝑀𝑆𝐷 = (𝜋 𝑟 , 𝛾) and 𝜃 𝑀𝑆𝐷 = (𝜋 𝑟 , 𝛾, 𝜆, 𝜙). One small complication flows from the
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𝜋𝑟

fact that this theory only satisfies monotonicity when 𝛾 2 < min (1−𝜋𝑟 ,

1−𝜋 𝑟
𝜋𝑟

), so this constraint

on the relationship between 𝜋 𝑟 and 𝛾 must be imposed during maximization of subject’s
likelihood functions. This constraint rarely binds (and never binds with statistical significance).
𝑟,𝑒
The distribution of estimated subjective priors 𝜋̂ℳ
across subjects may interest some readers.

The 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th centiles of this distribution are 0.465, 0.490, 0.500, 0.521 and
0.555, respectively (we think that with just 79 subjects, centiles further into the tails aren’t too
meaningful). This is a fairly tight distribution around uniform subjective priors.

A2: A Sufficient Condition for SWUP to Satisfy Certainty Betweenness
Consider the following frame involving a choice between a constant option 𝐾 and an ambiguous
act 𝑋, encompassing basic pairs 1 through 7 from our experiment as special cases.
𝐾
𝑋

$25
$25

𝑝
𝑞𝑟

Red Ticket
$0
$0

1−𝑝
1 − 𝑞𝑟

$25
$25

Blue Ticket
$0
𝑝
$0
𝑞𝑏

1−𝑝
1 − 𝑞𝑏

Let 𝑟 and 𝑏 denote the red and blue ticket states, respectively. Normalize 𝑢(25) = 1, and
𝑢(0) = 0. Under SWUP, 𝐾 ~ 𝑋 ⟺ 𝜋 𝑟 𝜓Ρ (𝑝, 𝑞𝑟 )(𝑝 − 𝑞𝑟 ) + (1 − 𝜋 𝑟 )𝜓Ρ (𝑝, 𝑞𝑏 )(𝑝 − 𝑞𝑏 ) = 0.
Act 𝐾 and mixture 𝑊 ≔ 𝛿𝐾 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑋 are shown below in the red and blue ticket states:
𝐾(𝑟)
𝑊(𝑟)

$25
$25

𝐾(𝑏)
𝑊(𝑏)

$25
$25

𝛿𝑝
𝛿𝑝

𝛿𝑝
𝛿𝑝

$0
$0

$0
$0

𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)

𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)

Red Ticket
$25
(1 − 𝛿)𝑝
$25
(1 − 𝛿)𝑞𝑟
Blue Ticket
$25
(1 − 𝛿)𝑝
$25
(1 − 𝛿)𝑞𝑏

$0
$0

$0
$0

(1 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝑝)
(1 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝑞𝑟 )

(1 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝑝)
(1 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝑞𝑏 )

For basic pairs 1 through 7, certainty betweenness implies this condition for SWUP:
(A10) 𝐾 ~ 𝑊 ⟺ 𝜋 𝑟 𝜓P ((1 − 𝛿)𝑝, (1 − 𝛿)𝑞𝑟 )(1 − 𝛿)(𝑝 − 𝑞𝑟 )
+ (1 − 𝜋 𝑟 )𝜓Ρ ((1 − 𝛿)𝑝, (1 − 𝛿)𝑞𝑏 )(1 − 𝛿)(𝑝 − 𝑞𝑏 ) = 0.
Bordalo et al. (2013) argue that homogeneity of degree zero is a plausible property of a salience
function and they assume that property in their analysis of salience in consumer choice. They
define homogeneity of degree zero as follows: 𝜓(𝛿𝑎𝑖 , 𝛿𝑏𝑖 ) = 𝜓(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ) for all 𝛿 > 0.
Under homogeneity of degree zero, eq. A10 reduces to:
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(A11) 𝐾 ~ 𝑊 ⟺ (1 − 𝛿)[𝜋 𝑟 𝜓Ρ (𝑝, 𝑞𝑟 )(𝑝 − 𝑞𝑟 ) + (1 − 𝜋 𝑟 )𝜓Ρ (𝑝, 𝑞𝑏 )(𝑝 − 𝑞𝑏 )] = 0.
Note that eq. A7 is also the condition for 𝑋 ~ 𝐾, and thus certainty betweenness holds under
SWUP for basic pairs 1 through 7 if the probability salience function satisfies homogeneity of
degree zero. A ‘parameter-free’ salience function, introduced by Bordalo et al. (2013), which
satisfies ordering, diminishing sensitivity, and homogeneity of degree zero is shown below:
(A12) 𝜓(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ) ∶= |𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 |⁄(|𝑎𝑖 | + |𝑏𝑖 |) if 𝑎 ≠ 0 or 𝑏 ≠ 0; and 𝜓(0,0): = 0.
In our estimations, we use another ‘parameter-free’ salience function introduced by Leland,
Schneider and Wilcox (2017):
(A13) 𝜓(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 |(𝑎, 𝑏)) ∶= |𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 |⁄(|𝑎𝑖 | + |𝑏𝑖 | + ‖(𝑎, 𝑏)‖),
where ‖(𝑎, 𝑏)‖ is the Euclidean norm of the vector (𝑎, 𝑏) that horizontally concatenates all like
dimension vectors in a frame (i.e., all outcomes in a frame, or all probabilities in a frame, for
both options in that frame). This salience function also satisfies ordering and diminishing
sensitivity and a modified homogeneity of degree zero 𝜓(𝛿𝑎𝑖 , 𝛿𝑏𝑖 |(𝛿𝑎, 𝛿𝑏)) = 𝜓(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 |(𝑎, 𝑏)).
With this property, eq. A10 will still reduce to eq. A11 when 𝛿 = 0.5. This restricted certainty
betweenness is all we need for incentive compatibility of the indifference response (since the
coin flip resolving indifference is a 50:50 mixture).

A3. Ranking Acts by Their Robustness to Ambiguity
All basic pairs from the experiment are shown below. We can rank how robust options A and
B are to ambiguity by measuring the difference between the red and blue probability
distributions for A and for B. The smaller the difference between the red and blue distributions,
the greater the robustness to ambiguity. One standard approach to measuring differences between
two probability distributions is to use an ‘f-divergence’. Hellinger distance (Hellinger 1909;
Sengar 2009) and total variation distance (Levin et al. 2009) are two common f-divergences. Let
P and Q be discrete distributions with finite support. The Hellinger distance between them is:
𝐻𝐷(𝑃, 𝑄) =

1
√2

1/2

[∑𝑛𝑖=1(√𝑝𝑖 − √𝑞𝑖 )2 ]

.

The total variation distance is the maximum difference in probabilities that P and Q assign to the
same event:
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𝑇𝑉𝐷(𝑃, 𝑄) = max𝑖 |𝑝(𝑖) − 𝑞(𝑖)|.
Option A

Basic
pair #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25

Red ticket
0.50 $0
0.50 $0
0.67 $0
0.33 $0
0.50 $0
0.50 $0
0.33 $0
0.67 $0
0.67 $0
0.50 $0
0.50 $0

0.50
0.50
0.33
0.67
0.50
0.50
0.67
0.33
0.33
0.50
0.50

$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25

Option B
Blue ticket
0.50 $0
0.50 $0
0.67 $0
0.33 $0
0.50 $0
0.50 $0
0.33 $0
0.33 $0
0.50 $0
0.33 $0
0.33 $0

0.50
0.50
0.33
0.67
0.50
0.50
0.67
0.67
0.50
0.67
0.67

$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25

Red ticket
0.75 $0
1.00 $0
1.00 $0
0.67 $0
1.00 $0
1.00 $0
0.50 $0
1.00 $0
1.00 $0
1.00 $0
0.75 $0

0.25
0.00
0.00
0.33
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.25

$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25
$25

Blue ticket
0.25 $0
0.00 $0
0.33 $0
0.00 $0
0.25 $0
0.33 $0
0.00 $0
0.00 $0
0.33 $0
0.00 $0
0.00 $0

0.75
1.00
0.67
1.00
0.75
0.67
1.00
1.00
0.67
1.00
1.00

Let the events be winning $25 and winning $0. The Hellinger distance and the total variation
distance can be computed for options A and B above. The resulting values are shown in the
tables below which reveal that they both imply the same ranking of ‘robustness’ to ambiguity. In
each case, option A has a smaller distance between the red and blue distributions, indicating that
it is more robust to ambiguity than option B in each pair.
Hellinger distance
Basic pair
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.24
0.12
0.12
0.12

B
0.37
1
0.65
0.65
0.71
0.65
0.54
1
0.65
1
0.71

Total Variation distance
Basic pair
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.333
0.167
0.167
0.167

B
0.5
1
0.67
0.67
0.75
0.67
0.5
1
0.67
1
0.75
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A4. Proof of Proposition 1 in Section 3.3
Proposition 1: Let ≻ (~) denote strict preference (indifference) as determined by the HurwiczSWUP criterion in eq. 5. For the choice situations shown below in Figures A1 and A2 (where
𝜖 > 0 and 𝑧 > 0; basic pairs 1 to 4 are cases of these), with constant act 𝑌 and ambiguous act 𝑋:
(i) If 𝑋 ~ 𝑌 in the minimal frame then 𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 in the transparent frame.
(ii) If 𝑋 ~ 𝑌 in the transparent frame then 𝑌 ≻ 𝑋 in the minimal frame.
Proof: Set 𝑢(𝑧) = 1 and 𝑢(0) = 0.
Proof of (i): Under eq. 5, 𝑋 ~ 𝑌 in the minimal frame in Figure A1 implies
𝛼𝜓Ρ (𝑝 + 𝜖, 𝑝)(𝜖) + (1 − 𝛼)𝜓Ρ (𝑝 − 𝜖, 𝑝)(−𝜖) = 0,
which implies 𝛼𝜓Ρ (𝑝 + 𝜖, 𝑝) = (1 − 𝛼)𝜓Ρ (𝑝 − 𝜖, 𝑝). By symmetry and diminishing
absolute sensitivity of 𝜓Ρ , we have 𝜓Ρ (𝑝 + 𝜖, 𝑝) < 𝜓Ρ (𝑝 − 𝜖, 𝑝). Hence 𝑋 ~ 𝑌 in the
minimal frame implies that 𝛼 > 0.5.
For the transparent frame in Figure A2, under eq. 5, we have 𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 if and only if
𝛼𝜓Χ (𝑥, 0)(1)(𝜖) + (1 − 𝛼)𝜓Χ (0, 𝑥)(−1)(𝜖) < 0.
By symmetry of 𝜓Χ , the above inequality holds if and only if 𝛼 > 0.5. ∎
Proof of (ii): Under eq. 5, 𝑋 ~ 𝑌 in the transparent frame if and only if 𝛼 = 0.5. Given 𝛼 = 0.5,
diminishing sensitivity and symmetry of 𝜓Ρ imply 𝑌 ≻ 𝑋 in the minimal frame. ∎
Figure A1. Form of Basic Pairs 1-4 in Minimal Frames

Red Ticket State
Y 𝑧

𝑝

1−𝑝

0

X 𝑧 𝑝+𝜖 0 1−𝑝−𝜖

Blue Ticket State
𝑧

𝑝

0

1−𝑝

𝑧 𝑝−𝜖 0 1−𝑝+𝜖

Figure A2 Form of Basic Pairs 1-4 in Transparent Frames
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𝑧

𝑝
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𝜖
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1−𝑝−𝜖

𝑧

𝑝−𝜖

𝑧

𝜖

0

1−𝑝

X

𝑧

𝑝

z

𝜖

0

1−𝑝−𝜖
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0
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0

1−𝑝
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A5 Experimental Materials
The experimental materials are available here:
http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/economic-scienceinstitute/_files/WorkingPapers/schneider-leland-wilcox-ambiguity-framed-2016b.pdf

These materials include:





The Instruction Booklet
Ellsberg Experiment Booklet 1 (Choice Situations 1 – 20)
Ellsberg Experiment Booklet 2 (Choice Situations 21 – 40)
Ellsberg Experiment Booklet 3 (Choice Situations 41 – 60)
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